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The purpose of this paper is to interpret,  from the viewpoint of an economist,  some
of the  causes  of the  'Sagebrush  Rebellion,'  a  contemporary  land  reform  movement
directed  toward the Bureau of Land Management  and its control  of the public domain.
Distributive  equity  concerns  on  the  part  of  'Sagebrush  Rebellion'  supporters  are
identified,  as are the contributions  of neoclassical  welfare theory to the debate.  Reflec-
tions of those  social and theoretical concerns in Federal legislation and agency policy and
regulations are  explored.
The purpose  of this paper  is to provide  an
economic  interpretation  of  some  of  the
causes of the  "Sagebrush  Rebellion,"  a con-
temporary  land  reform  movement  directed
toward the  Federal government  and its con-
trol  of the  public  domain.  The  rebellion  is
focused,  primarily,  on  the  Bureau  of  Land
Management  (BLM) and its administration  of
public  rangeland  resources.  However,  the
land  reform  movement  has  much  broader
implications  for levels  of government,  agen-
cies  of government,  and groups interested  in
the use  of public land and water  resources.
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The primary  thesis  advanced  here  is  that
distributive  equity,  or  more  precisely  the
perceived  lack thereof in the minds  of tradi-
tional users of public land resources,  explains
much  of  the  current  concern  with  federal
land use planning processes  and decisions.  It
is  not  argued  that  equity  considerations
should be  of paramount  importance  in  the
public land use decision-making  process; nor
is it alleged that decision-makers at any level
are insensitive to the real or imagined conse-
quences of resource allocations on traditional
users.  Rather,  it  is  maintained  that  the  in-
stitutional  framework  within  which  federal
land use decisions  are  made and implement-
ed  has changed.  The effect  of that  change  is
to  limit both lay  participants  and public  ser-
vants who  ultimately  must make  and imple-
ment decisions to a set of criteria which slight
and  sometimes  exclude relevant distributive
issues. Arguments which would dismiss equi-
ty  implications  as  irrelevant  decision  vari-
ables  in public land use planning  simply add
fuel to  the "Sagebrush  Rebellion."
The  paper  consists  of four  parts.  In  the
introductory  section, distributive equity ver-
sus  economic  efficiency  are  identified  as
underlying concerns expressed by supporters
of  the  "Sagebrush  Rebellion."  The  debate
among  economists  concerning  the  relation-
ship  between  economic  efficiency  and  dis-
tributive equity is summarized,  and distribu-
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tional  issues  relevant  to  the  analysis  of the
economic  dimensions  of the "Sagebrush  Re-
bellion"  are  noted,  in  the  second  section.
The third  part  of the paper  summarizes  the
body of Federal legislation,  policy, and regu-
lations which  have served  as proximal causes
of  the  land  reform  movement;  and  the
economic  implications  of that legislation  are
highlighted.  The  concluding  section  deals
with recent  attempts by the Bureau of Land
Management  to resurrect  distributive equity
decision  criteria  in its land  use planning  and
management  processes.
An Economic  Interpretation of the
Sagebrush  Rebellion
In essence,  the "Sagebrush Rebellion"  is a
challenge  to  federal  control  over  the  public
domain in the western United States.  "What
is needed  is  an  entirely new  foundation  and
framework  for  the  utilization  and  manage-
ment of the public domain lands" [League for
the Advancement  of States' Equal  Rights,  p.
515].  At one  extreme,  proponents  would  di-
vest the federal  government  of public lands,
releasing  the  public  land  resources  of  the
West  to  the  states  and/or  to  private  owner-
ship.  Not  all  supporters  of the  "Sagebrush
Rebellion"  favor divestiture,  however.  Many
advocates  would be content with a change  in
management  philosophy  and  priorities:  a
change  which  would  "... demonstrate  an
ability to deal with public land issues in a fair
and equitable  way"  [Beef, p.79].
Support  for  the  "Sagebrush  Rebellion"  is
not  confined  to  the  rangeland  livestock  in-
dustry.  Other  supporters  emphasize  differ-
ent resource uses, notably mining and timber
harvesting,  but common  concerns  are  clear.
The federal government  is perceived  to have
failed  to  invest sufficiently  in the public  do-
main;  to  have  allowed  the  productivity  of
public  land  resources  to  diminish  through
improper  management;  and to have neglect-
ed to consider the opportunity costs to tradi-
tional users of land use decisions designed to
preserve  or enhance  environmental  quality.
To  argue  the  validity  of  these  charges
serves no useful purpose.  From the perspec-
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tive  of an  economist,  there  are  two  central
themes in these concerns: (1) economic  equi-
ty,  more  specifically,  the lack of distributive
equity  in the interregional  and  intersectoral
senses  vis-a-vis  national  economic  efficiency
and  environmental  quality  as  decision
criteria  in  the  public  land  use  decision-
making  process; 1 and  (2)  the  inadequacy  of
national  efficiency  criteria  as  guidelines  for
management  of  and  investment  in  public
land  and water  resources.
The Economic  Debate  on  Efficiency
and Distributive Equity
Even among economists there  is  consider-
able  debate  over the appropriateness  of effi-
ciency  and equity  criteria applied  to  public
investments.  In  1973  Haveman  argued  that
government  agencies  misuse  benefit-cost
analysis in project evaluation.  Reflecting  the
neoclassical  emphasis  on  national  efficiency
criteria  in  resource  development  decisions
he  stated:  "Even  more  discouraging  is  the
failure of inappropriate efficiency concepts -
secondary  and regional benefits...  - to  be
cast aside  in recent  efforts  to reform  evalua-
tion standards"  [Haveman,  p.  876].
Within  a  few  years  these  "inappropriate
efficiency  concepts"  had,  indeed,  been  cast
aside.  As the lead agency for policy formula-
tion  dealing  with  the  economics  of  project
evaluation,  the U.S. Water Resources  Coun-
cil in 1979 dropped regional economic  devel-
opment  from  its  earlier  national  objectives
and accounts  as a relevant decision criterion;
i.e.,  secondary  and/or  regional  benefits  and
costs no longer were to be evaluated [Federal
1As  used  here,  efficiency  refers  to  the relationship  be-
tween social benefits  and social costs without reference
to the incidence  of those values.  Equity refers to  wel-
fare  experienced  by  individuals  or groups  of individu-
als,  over  space  and  time.  Distributive  equity  is  the
system  of stratification,  or classification,  applied to the
streams  of social costs  and social  benefits.  By implica-
tion,  the  monetary  values  of  social  costs  and  social
benefits  (given the standard  neoclassical  assumptions),
when evaluated  on  the basis  of the incidence  of those
values,  approximate  the distributions  of welfare  losses
and gains.
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Register, September  10,  1973,  and  May  24,
1979].  The direction provided  by  the Water
Resources  Council is reflected  in the project
evaluation  guidelines  and  procedures  cur-
rently  employed  by  the  Bureau  and  most
other public land management  agencies.
Meanwhile,  others  were  arguing  that
"without...  a better measure  of the distribu-
tional impacts  (of public land allocations),  the
application  of efficiency criteria may not give
unambiguous  results  concerning  changes  in
welfare"  [Wyckoff,  pp.  18-19].  Of  special
concern  to Wyckoff was the limited informa-
tion  being  used  in  the  decision-making
process - particularly information  related to
the distribution  of costs  and benefits  among
population groups and geographic  areas.
The Theoretical Basis for the
Efficiency-Equity Dichotomy
The academic  debate touched upon here is
of ancient vintage.  Its basic inconclusiveness
leads  to  decisions,  lamented  by both  Have-
man and Wyckoff,  made in the political arena
and  largely  uninfluenced  by  economists  or
economic  analysis.  That  inconclusiveness  is
due  to  the  interdependence  between
economic  efficiency  and  economic  equity,
since  both are rooted  in interpersonal  utility
comparisons.  To  treat  the  two  criteria  as
distinctly  separate  is,  in  itself,  a value judg-
ment.  If economists  are to contribute  to the
public  land  decision-making  process,  and  if
they are to  do  so objectively,  both efficiency
and  equity  implications  of alternative  deci-
sions  are  legitimate  ends  of  research  and
information  delivery.  To do  less, i.e.,  to con-
fine  the scope  of economic  analysis  to either
efficiency or equity,  is to provide "... conclu-
sions (which) can  possess  no validity  outside
the  circle in  which  these  values  find accept-
ance"  [Hicks,  p.  696].
Weisbrod  views  the failure  of economists
and economics to provide  useful guidance  on
the illusionary dichotomy  as a matter of sim-
ple  expediency,  and  he  implies  that  econo-
mists sometimes forget the artificial nature of
their separation  [Weisbrod,  p.  180].  The ar-
tifice  is  reflected  in  four  assumptions  which
have  been  used  to  justify  the  omission  of
equity  from  economic  decision  criteria  in
project evaluation.
First,  all individuals  are  assumed  to  have
equal  marginal  utilities  of income,  meaning
that  the  welfare  of all  individuals  is  influ-
enced  in  a consistent  manner  by the  alloca-
tive decision.  A  second,  and closely  related,
assumption  is  that  the  weights  individuals
attach  to  marginal  changes  in  benefits  or
costs are all equal, "...  regardless  of the peo-
ple  who  received  that  benefit  or  who  bore
that  cost"  [Weisbrod,  p.  182].  These  two
assumptions  mean that all  members of socie-
ty value income gains or losses attributable to
resource  reallocations  equally.  Interpersonal
utility  comparisons  with  respect  to  money
income are made possible,  but are not neces-
sary,  since  enhanced  allocative  efficiency
necessarily  implies  increased  welfare.
Among  the  several  problems  with  these  as-
sumptions  is  the  possibility  of interdepend-
ence between  income  and nonmonetary  de-
terminants  of  utility,  e.g.,  access  to  "free"
public  goods.  Individuals  who  by  virtue  of
place  of residence  enjoy  greater  degrees  of
access  to  public  land  and  water  resources
may  well value  income  changes  consequent
to  public  resource  reallocations  differently
from  individuals  having  more limited  access
to the  same  resources.  As  Weisbrod  put  it,
the  assumptions  cannot  bear  scrutiny,  and
economists  have  made them  simply  for con-
venience.
The  third  assumption  used  to  separate
equity  from  efficiency  considerations  is  that
any action affecting  resource allocations  is  so
small  in  the  national  context  that  the  net
distribution  of  income  among  members  of
society will be unaffected by its implementa-
tion.  Hence,  the  social  effects of income re-
distribution  may  be disregarded.  The  prob-
lem with this assumption  is  that public land
and  water  resources  are  relatively  fixed  in
location.  Actions  which  increase  the  availa-
bility of resources for commodity uses gener-
ate  benefits  in  the  form  of  income  gains
which  tend  to be  captured  locally,  and vica
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versa.  Public  land  and  water  management
policies  can  have  significant  impacts  on  in-
come  distributions within and among subsets
of society,  i.e.,  public land dependent  com-
munities  [Obermiller,  1980].
It is partly in recognition  of the redistribu-
tional consequences  of resource  reallocations
that the fourth assumption  is  made:  Any  un-
favorable  distributional  effects  from a project
may be eliminated  by a compensating  redis-
tributional  program,  but if the  efficiency  ef-
fects  of the initial  project  are positive,  there
is  no  need  for  actual  compensation.  This
fourth  argument,  popularly  known  as  the
"Kaldor-Hicks  Compensation  Principle,"  has
been invoked to allow economists  to separate
the  production  effects  of  economic  policy
from  their distributional  consequences.  Nu-
merous writers have criticized the principle,
but the empirical validity of the Kaldor-Hicks
test remains  in  doubt unless  "costless"  com-
pensation  does  in  fact  occur.  In  reality,  an
appropriate  test  of the  hypothesis  may  be
impossible  because  existing  states  of market
competition  and  resource  allocation  are  in-
consistent  with  those  (perfect  competition
and full  employment)  assumed.
Resurrecting Distributive Equity
as a Relevant Decision Criterion
If these four assumptions are,  in fact, theo-
retically  invalid  or  inconsistent  with  reality,
then  equity criteria  may well be  relevant  to
the public land  allocative  decision.  The  dis-
tributional  effects  of such  decisions  may  be
no  more  nor  less  important  considerations
than  national  income  gains  or  losses.
Moreover,  the  efficacy  of  the  efficiency
criteria  themselves  can  be  seriously  ques-
tioned. 2
2If  individuals  have  different  marginal  utilities  of  in-
come, and also weight  marginal changes  in benefits  and
costs  differently,  a  utilitarian  social  welfare  function
cannot  be  constructed,  and  interpersonal  utility  com-
parisons  are  not possible.  Hence,  the pareto  optimum
efficiency frontier  is not  measurable,  and it is impossi-
ble to conclude whether resource allocations  generating
total social benefits in excess  of total social  costs  (i.e., a
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These  observations  suggest  that  existing
efficiency  and  equity criteria for  public land
use  planning  are  inadequate  because  the
underlying  theoretical  construct  is  incom-
plete.  Pending the  emergence  of more  gen-
eral theory  and appropriate  decision criteria,
economists  can  make  a positive  contribution
to  the decision-making  process  by recogniz-
ing  that  distributive  equity  concerns  may
have  validity,  and  by  providing  decision-
makers  and  society  as  a  whole  with  sound
information  on  the  distributional  conse-
quences  of  public  land  resource  allocations
[Haveman  and Weisbrod].
What  might  the  relevant  distributional
consequences  be?  Clearly,  "Sagebrush  Re-
bellion"  supporters  and  other  traditional
public land  dependent interests  feel that the
interpersonal  costs  and benefits  of land man-
agement  and  use  allocations  are  important.
Many  of  their  arguments  are  couched  in
terms  of the selective  impact of federal  land
policies on commodity  groups,  or industries,
connoting  the relevance  of intersectoral  im-
pacts.  The fact that 14  western states  (Neva-
da,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho,  Montana,
California,  New  Mexico,  North  Dakota,
South  Dakota,  Arizona,  Alaska,  Utah,  Wy-
oming,  Colorado)  have  recently  considered
and in  some cases  actually  passed legislation
which  would  place  within the  state respon-
sibilities  for  management  of the  public  do-
main  - responsibilities  now  vested  in  the
federal  government  - is  an  obvious  ex-
pression  of  the  relevance  of interregional
distributions  of costs  and benefits.  The  crea-
tion and  rapid  rise  in influence  of the West-
ern  Governors  Policy  Office  (WESTPO),
which  seeks  to ensure that western interests
are  safeguarded and amply rewarded as their
natural  resources  are  developed  in  accord-
ance  with  national  objectives,  further  illus-
trates the  merit in  considering  interregional
impacts.  Finally,  the  intertemporal dimen-
sion of distributive  equity is  applicable.  It is
benefit-cost  ratio  greater  than  one)  move  society  to-
ward,  or away from, a more efficient  pattern of resource
allocation.
December 1982Sagebrush Rebellion
not  only  the  long-run  consequences,  "...a
combination  of  balanced  and  diverse  uses
that takes  into account  the long-term  needs
of future generations  for renewable  and non-
renewable resources..."  [Federal Land Pol-
icy  and  Management  Act,  Section  103(c)],
which are of concern.  Many traditional  users
find  short-run  reductions  in resource  availa-
bilities,  even though long-run supply may be
thereby  enhanced,  to  be  of  significance  as
well.  As one rancher put it in commenting on
a  proposed  reduction  in  his  grazing  permit:
"If you cut me 34 percent  (as a cost-effective
approach  to enhancing  long-term  range  con-
ditions),  I  would  have  nothing  and  would
have  a  net  loss  of  about  $1,500  last  year.
That's  the  economic  impact  of  myself'
[Bureau of Land Mangement,  1980(b),  p.  C-
98].  To  translate,  short-term  private  costs
may not be offset by long-term  public bene-
fits.  Or  alternatively,  the  promise  of in-
creased  rangeland  forage  supplies  15  years
hence  may not satisfy the present  permittee
if he must go out of business  in the interim.
The Contribution of Federal Legislation
to  the Sagebrush  Rebellion
The  "Sagebrush  Rebellion"  is  neither
novel  nor unprecedented  [Matthews].  Wes-
terners  have  for  years  "rebelled"  against
Federal  (often paraphrased  as  eastern inter-
ests)  control  over  the  land  and  water  re-
sources of the Interior  West,  their develop-
ment and disposition.  Examples  include  the
populist-led  agrarian  revolt of the 1890s,  the
western-backed  Stock-Raising  Homestead
Act  of  1916,  and  to  some  extent  even  the
furor  over  overstocking  and  exploitation  of
the  public rangelands  leading  to the  Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934.
Unrestricted use of public rangelands,  par-
ticularly  overgrazing  by  nomadic  bands  of
sheep  whose  owners  had  little  or  no  base
property,  and hence minimal vested interest
in maintaining the land's productivity,  led to
severe  rangeland  deterioration  early  in  the
twentieth  century.  Between  1899  and  1934
bills were introduced in  each session of Con-
gress  to  limit  and  control  use  by  domestic
livestock  of the  public  rangelands.  During
the  late  1800s  a  series  of laws  were  passed
giving  what was  to  become  the  Forest  Ser-
vice  the authority  to regulate  grazing  in  the
Forest  Reserves  (National  Forests);  and
under the leadership  of Gifford  Pinchot such
a  regulatory  system  was  developed  and im-
plemented.  Only  ranchers  who  owned  or
controlled base property in or near the public
forests,  and even then only  those who could
demonstrate  dependency  on public land for-
age  supplies,  were  permitted  to  use  those
resources.  Further, permittees were charged
a  grazing  fee.  Ultimately,  nomadic  sheep
operations  were  forced  off  the  Forest  Re-
serves,  but  they  and  others  continued  to
enjoy  unlimited  access  to  the  open  public
rangelands  [Malin;  Matthews].
Intent, Content, and Implications
of the Taylor Grazing Act
Their  access  ceased  with  passage  of  the
Taylor  Grazing  Act in  1934,  a law patterned
after  the  statutes  and  policies  of the  Forest
Service.  While hotly  debated,  ultimate  pas-
sage  of such  legislation  was  inevitable:  "To
stop  injury  to  the  public  grazing  lands  by
preventing  overgrazing  and  soil  deteriora-
tion,  to  provide  for  their  orderly  use,  im-
provement,  and  development,  to  stabilize
the livestock industry dependent on the pub-
lic range."  The Act placed in the Secretary of
the Interior  full  responsibility  for regulation
of public rangelands  pending their final dis-
posal. Grazing districts and grazing fees were
authorized.  As  with  the  Forest  Service,
"Preference  shall be given  in the issuance of
grazing  permits  to  those  within  or  near  a
district who  are  landowners  engaged  in  the
livestock business"  [Taylor Grazing Act,  Sec-
tion 3].
The Taylor  Grazing Act was  clearly orient-
ed  toward  production  of  forage  for  use  by
public  land  dependent  ranchers.  Range  im-
provements were authorized.  Improvements
were  to  be financed  from  grazing fees,  with
50  percent  of the  fees  paid  by  permittees
within a grazing district to be remitted to the
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state  within  which  the  district  was  located
"...  to be  expended  as  the  State  legislature
may prescribe for the benefit of the county or
counties  in  which  the  grazing  district  is
situated" [Taylor Grazing Act, Sections  2 and
3].
The  wording  of  the  Taylor  Grazing  Act
suggests  that  Congress  was  concerned  with
both  economic  efficiency  (especially  but not
exclusively  in  the  regional  context)  and dis-
tributive equity  (in the intersectoral  and in-
terregional sense).  Interpersonal equity  con-
siderations were also implied.  Not only were
landowners  with  proximal  base  property  to
be preferred  permittees:  The Act gave  pref-
erence  to owners  of contiguous  lands  in the
purchase  of public  rangelands  offered  for
sale;  directed  that  prior  occupants  who  had
made  range  improvements  would  be  reim-
bursed for their expenses  by subsequent per-
mittees;  and authorized the  Secretary to  de-
crease  or  remit  fees  if forage  supplies  were
reduced during a grazing  season due to natu-
ral causes.
Operating  under the auspices of the Taylor
Grazing  Act the  Grazing  Service,  and  since
1946  the  Bureau  of  Land  Management,
adopted a largely custodial role toward public
land management.  "For at least 30 years, one
of  the  most  important  clients  in  the  total
BLM bureaucratic  machine was  strictly  local
- by law and practice  the  national  interest
was defined to  be  the  local  interest"  [Matt-
hews,  p.  28].  Grazing  cuts  to  dependent
ranchers were avoided; and the public range-
lands  were  managed  so  as  to  stabilize  and
improve  the economic  welfare of dependent
communities.
Judicial  interpretation  of the Taylor  Graz-
ing  Act and,  consequently,  of the legislated
role of the Federal government in the admin-
istration  of the  public  rangelands  of the  In-
terior West,  further emphasized stabilization
of the  rangeland  livestock  industry  and  de-
pendent  communities  as  a  management  ob-
jective.  In case after  case, the purpose of the
Act was  interpreted  to "...  provide  for (the)
most  beneficial  use  possible  of (the)  public
range  in  (the)  interest  of  grazers  and  (the)
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public at large,  to define grazing rights and to
protect  those  rights by  regulation  against
interference."3 It can and probably should be
argued  that  from  1934  through  the  mid-
1960s,  equity considerations  in public range-
land  management  and  development  worked
to the  advantage  of local  interests  and tradi-
tional users.
Precursor  to Change: Activities of the
Public Land Law Review Commission
As  the  body  of laws  and regulations  gov-
erning  the  administration  of  federal  lands
grew,  they  also  became  more  complex  and
internally inconsistent.  In recognition of that
problem, and perhaps due also to the emerg-
ing social concerns  for  the environment  and
for the  multiple  uses  of the  public  domain,
Congress  established  the  Public  Land  Law
Review  Commission  in  1964.  The  general
charge  to  the  Commission  was  to  review
existing  public  land  laws  and  make  recom-
mendations  concerning  any  necessary  revi-
sions.
The  hearings  and  studies  undertaken  by
the  Commission  were  broad  in  scope,  both
geographically and in subject matter.  Follow-
ing  lengthy  public  hearings,  the  Commis-
sion's findings and recommendations  for pub-
lic land management were presented in 1970
[Public  Land  Law  Review  Commission].
Many of its  recommendations  related  to  fu-
ture  management  and  use  of public  range-
lands;  and  of  these  several  referred  to
economic  efficiency and/or distributive  equi-
ty  as  relevant  decision criteria.
The relevance  of efficiency  criteria gener-
ally  surfaced  in  the  recommendations  that:
(1) use  of public  rangelands  be  regulated  in
such a way that deterioration  of the resource
base be prevented;  (2) users  of public range-
land resources be assessed a fair market value
3Red Canyon Sheep Co.  vs Ickes,  1938,  98  F. 2d 308, 69
App.  D.C.  27;  see  also  Chournos  vs  U.S.,  C.A.  Utah
1951,  193 F  2nd,  certiori denied,  72  S. Ct.  1074,  343
U.S.  977, 96  L Ed.  1369;  Hatahley vs U.S.,  Utah 1956,
76  S. Ct.  745,  351  U.S.  173,  100  L.  Ed.  1065.
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in  exchange  for  their  use  privilege;  and  (3)
federal  decision-makers  design  rangeland
management policies to attain "...  maximum
economic  efficiency  in  the  production  and
use  of forage  from  the public  lands"  [Public
Land Law Review Commission,  Recommen-
dation  37].  As  has  been  shown  elsewhere,
virtually  all of the  Commission's  recommen-
dations  for economic  efficiency  as  a relevant
public  land  management  decision  criteria
subsequently  were  incorporated  in  federal
legislation  [Carver].
However,  the Commission  also concluded
that national efficiency  criteria should not be
the  sole  economic  consideration  in  federal
land  use  planning.  Regional  economic
growth  was  seen  as  a  proper  objective  in
public land forage policy; and it was suggest-
ed  that  regional economic  efficiency  as  a
decision  criteria would  promote,  or be  con-
sistent with,  interregional  distributive equity
as a public land management  objective  [Pub-
lic  Land  Law Review  Commission,  p.  106].
Concern for interpersonal equity was implied
in  Recommendation  43  which  would  have
afforded  public  land  dependent  ranchers
some measure  of protection for their proper-
ty rights  by controlling  access  to  and  use  of
public rangelands so as to avoid unreasonable
interference  with  authorized  livestock  use.
Intersectoral  equity considerations were sug-
gested  in Recommendation  42,  which found
that  some  lands  were  chiefly  suited  to  live-
stock production,  and that in these areas such
use  should be considered  dominant.
Not  all  of these  recommendations  were
adopted  by Congress,  however.  Subsequent
legislation  did retain the  recommended  effi-
ciency criteria, although not in the suggested
regional  context.  The  same  legislation  also
adopted  the  recommendation  that all  public
lands  be  retained  in  Federal  ownership.
However,  recommendations  for interregion-
al, intersectoral,  or interpersonal distributive
equity as relevant criteria in public rangeland
management were not retained;  nor was sub-
sequent legislation to recognize the principle
of dominant  use.4
Catalyst: The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act
With the passage of the Federal Land Poli-
cy and  Management  Act  (FLPMA)  in  1976,
and its counterpart for the Forest Service -
the  National  Forest  Mangement  Act,  an  era
officially  ended.  Public  land  use  policy
changed  dramatically,  and perhaps not coin-
cidentally,  some traditional public land users
began to express their resentment. 5 Due less
perhaps  to  the  substance  of  the  legislation
than to its radical departure from the decrees
of  the  Taylor  Grazing  Act,  a  seed  of  the
"Sagebrush  Rebellion"  was  sown.  National
economic  efficiency  and nontraditional  uses
of  public  rangeland  resources  emasculated
regional  economic  growth  and  historically
dominant  uses  as  public  land  management
objectives.
Policy  Directives  and  Their  Equity  Im-
plications.  The  Federal  Land  Policy  and
Management  Act's  Declaration of Policy says
more than that the public domain will remain
public,  managed  under multiple  use  princi-
ples.  Authorizing  the Bureau  of Land  Man-
agement  as  a full-fledged  federal  land  man-
agement  agency  with  broad  regulatory  and
enforcement  powers,  the  policy  directives
place  national  objectives  and  environmental
protection  in  positions  of primacy.  The  first
directive retains public lands in Federal own-
ership.  The  eighth  directive  suggests  that
land use goals  and objectives include preser-
vation of environmental qualities  and cultural
4Representative  Wayne Aspinall (Colorado) introduced a
bill  in  the  93rd  Congress  which  would  have  incor-
porated  all  of the  Public  Land  Law  Review Commis-
sion's recommendations bearing on efficiency and equi-
ty  criteria  as  referenced  above.  The  bill was  strongly
opposed  by certain interest groups and was not passed.
Especially  odious to these  groups  was the concept that
certain lands may have a "highest and best use" [Muys].
5The forest products  industry apparently  was more sup-
portive  of the  National  Forest  Management  Act  than
was the  rangeland  livestock  industry supportive  of the
Federal  Land Policy  and  Management  Act  [LeMaster
and Popovich].
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resources,  lands  in  their  natural  state  (wil-
derness  areas),  fish  and  wildlife  habitat,  do-
mestic  livestock  habitat,  outdoor  recreation
opportunities,  and human occupancy and use
-in  that order.  The ninth directive  implies
that subsidization  of traditional  uses  and us-
ers  must  end.  The  eleventh  directive  pro-
vides for protection  of areas  of "critical envi-
ronmental  concern."  Not  until  the  twelfth
objective  are  commodity  uses  of  public
rangeland  resources  explicitly  recognized,
and even then  only consistent  with the "Na-
tion's need."  The final directive  does refer to
a form  of distributive  equity,  but only  as  it
relates  to  'in lieu  of taxes'  payments  to state
and  local  governments  [Federal  Land Policy
and Management  Act,  Section  102].
Elsewhere  in  the Act indirect reference  is
made to intertemporal equity.  Title II directs
that,  in future federal land use planning,  the
Secretary  shall  "weigh long-term  benefits  to
the  public  against  short-term  benefits."  A
hint of equity of a different sort is implied in
the  statement  that  allotment  management
plans  shall  be  "... prepared  in  consultation
with  the  lessees  or  permittees  involved...
which...  prescribe  the  manner  in,  and  ex-
tent  to,  which  livestock  operations  will  be
conducted in order to meet the multiple-use,
sustained-yield,  economic  and  other  needs
and objectives  as  determined  for the land by
the  Secretary"  [Federal  Land  Policy  and
Management  Act,  Section  103(K)(1)].
Quite clearly,  FLPMA changed  the status
of traditional  rangeland  users  and local  com-
munities  as  interpreted  by  the  BLM  when
that agency was operating under the auspices
of  the  Taylor  Grazing  Act.  Nowhere  in
FLPMA is there evidence that local interests
are  of any  special  significance;  indeed,  pre-
cisely the opposite is true (i.e., local interests
are  implicitly  assumed  to  be  identical  with
the  national interest).  Hence,  the  residents
of public land dependent communities  could
be  expected  to  feel  that  the  new  law,  and
Bureau  actions  consistent  therewith,  were
inequitable  in  the  interregional sense.
FLPMA  also  formalizes  the  shift  from  the
production-orientation  of  public  rangeland
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management under the Taylor Grazing Act to
preservation  and  conservation  of rangeland
resources  for the benefit of future  users and/
or generations.  An implied consequence  was
reduction  in  licensed  grazing  of  domestic
livestock,  leading  traditional  users  to  ques-
tion the intertemporal  equity of the Congres-
sional  initiative.  By awarding  equal  priority
in  management  objectives  to  uses  of public
rangeland  resources  which  historically were
not  dominant,  traditional  commodity  inter-
ests  such as the  rangeland livestock industry
were led to question  the intersectoral  equity
of  the  new  Act.  Finally,  by  acknowledging
that the public lands were to be managed and
used  for  the benefit  of all  Americans,  those
who  traditionally  had  depended  on  public
rangelands  for  their  economic  livelihood
were led to attack the interpersonal  equity of
the law.
Coping  with  Expanded  Bureau  of  Land
Management  Responsibilities.  In a very real
sense,  FLPMA was the Bureau of Land Man-
agement's  "Organic Act,"  giving that agency
a full  range  of executive  powers,  duties,  and
functions,  as well as consistent  appropriation
authorization.  Only now was the Bureau  in a
position to truly manage the public domain in
pursuit of national  goals  and objectives.
With  those  duties  came  the  need  for  the
BLM  to  aggressively  implement  other  laws
bearing on the management and use of public
lands.  Several of these related laws,  enacted
during  the  period  of  growing  social  con-
sciousness and environmental concern  of the
1960s  and  early  1970s,  provided  for  special
uses  or protection  of the public domain  and
its  resources.  Examples  include  the  Wil-
derness Act of 1964, Wild and Scenic  Rivers
Act of 1968,  Wild Horses and Burros Protec-
tion  Act  of  1971,  and  the  Threatened  and
Endangered  Species  Act  of  1973.  Written
into the language of FLPMA were provisions
insuring  compliance  with  these  pieces  of
legislation  (see  especially  Sections  102(8),
103(a) and  (c),  404,  and  603).
Of more  significance  was  the need for  the
Bureau of Land  Management  to  abide,  in all
December 1982Sagebrush Rebellion
of  its  planning  and  project  evaluation
processes,  by the  provisions  of the  National
Environmental  Policy  Act  of  1969  (NEPA).
Section  102  of  NEPA  required  all  federal
agencies  (or state agencies  with federal fund-
ing)  which  undertake  actions  affecting  the
quality of the human environment to prepare
statements  documenting  associated  environ-
mental impacts.
However,  the  Council  on  Environmental
Quality  did not issue  regulations  for the  im-
plementation  of  NEPA  until  1978.  In  the
interim  each  federal  agency  was  to  develop
and  implement  its  own  set  of  guidelines.
Prior to  1976,  the Bureau  was  at a disadvan-
tage,  relative to  other agencies,  in  its efforts
to implement  the  NEPA  process.  Those  ef-
forts were judged to be insufficient when,  in
1974  and  1975,  the  Natural  Resources  De-
fense  Council  filed  and  won  two  lawsuits
against the BLM,  one directed toward range-
land, and the second toward forestland plan-
ning [LaFollette].  Since that time the Bureau
has  attempted  to  comply  with  the  letter  of
the law, under the watchful eye of the courts,
by preparing  site-specific environmental  im-
pact statements.
Not until August 1979 were the procedural
guidelines  for present  Bureau  of Land  Man-
agement  planning  processes  and  environ-
mental  impact  statement  preparation
codified.  The  code  does  not  specify  how
economic  analysis  is  to be done,  but it  does
imply  the  types  of  economic  issues  to  be
considered.  Economic efficiency  is identified
as a relevant planning  and decision criterion:
"the estimated sustained  levels of the various
goods,  services,  and  uses  that  may  be  at-
tained under existing biological and physical
conditions  and  under differing  management
practices and degrees  of management  inten-
sity  which  are  economically  viable  under
benefit-cost  or  cost  effectiveness  standards
prescribed in national or State Director guid-
ance"  (Code  of Federal  Regulations,  August
7,  1979,  Subpart  10601.5-4(4)].  Interregional
equity  considerations  likewise  are  relevant,
in that "the relative significance  of the public
land  products,  services,  and  uses  to  local
economies  shall  be  considered"  (Subpart
1601.0-8(d)).  Further,  resource  management
plans  must  not  ignore  the  degree  of  local
dependence  on resources  from  public lands
(Subpart  1601.7-4(7)).  The  intertemporal
equity issue is implied by the stated principle
that  "long-term  benefits  and  detriments  to
the  public  shall  be  weighed  against  short-
term  benefits  and  detriments"  (Subpart
1601.0-8(i)).  No  direct  reference  to  either
interpersonal  or  intersectoral  considerations
appears  in the  code of regulations.
Can Recognition  of Distributive Equity
Concerns  Avert the Sagebrush  Rebellion?
Few would disagree that, as of this writing,
the procedures  developed and implemented
by  the  Bureau,  at  least  with  respect  to
economic  analysis  guidelines,  are  inade-
quate.  In fact,  it is  questionable  whether the
existing  procedural  guidelines  conform  with
the  scope  and  intent  of the  Bureau's  own
code  of  regulations  [Bureau  of  Land  Man-
agement,  1980(a)].  These  deficiencies  are
recognized  by the  BLM,  and  are  implicitly
acknowledged  in  the  agency's  March  1981
"Social  and  Economic  Analysis"  policy  and
action plan.
"The  changing  environment  of public  land
management  requires  that the  quality of so-
cial  and  economic  analysis  in  BLM  be  im-
proved,  that  the  development  and  use  of
rigorous  social  and  economic  analysis  tech-
niques be pursued  efficiently,  and,  most im-
portantly,  that more  efficient,  equitable,  and
timely  management  decisions  be  made,  in-
cluding strategies  for improved  impact miti-
gation when national needs conflict with local
preferences  and fiscal capability"  [p.  6].
The policy  and action plan sets in motion a
process  to achieve  three  goals:  (1) policy and
procedural  guidance;  (2)  enhanced  meth-
odological  capability;  and  (3)  guidance  on
mitigating the adverse impacts of public land
use decisions.  Interim procedural guidance  is
provided  by existing instructional  memoran-
da,  e.g.,  [Bureau  of  Land  Management,
1979,  1980(c),  1981(a)].  These  existing
guidelines  are consistent  with  the  U.S.  Wa-
ter Resource  Council's  emphasis,  in its  1979
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version  of the  Principles  and  Standards,  on
national  economic  efficiency  and  environ-
mental quality as decision  criteria.  However,
these  interim  guidelines  also  are  somewhat
inconsistent with the distributive equity con-
cerns expressed  in the Code  of Federal Reg-
ulations  and  in  the  Bureau's  recent  policy
and action plan.
In  December  1981  the  BLM  issued  In-
structional  Memorandum  82-106,  the  pur-
pose  of which  is  to  establish  a  process  for
developing  new  economic  analysis  proce-
dures and  criteria  for  rangeland  investment
[Bureau of Land Management,  1981(c)].  The
memorandum  acknowledges  that  the
Bureau's  techniques  for  project  evaluation
have not kept pace with changing policy, and
that  these  techniques  have  been  subject  to
criticism  by  Congressional  representatives,
members of the livestock industry,  university
economists,  and  the  Office  of  Management
and  Budget.  The process  to  be followed  in-
volves  the  explicit collaboration  of a team of
Bureau  economists,  senior  managers,  and
"western  university  economists" prior to the
adoption  of the  new criteria  and procedures
for economic analysis by the BLM.  The chal-
lenge  facing  both  agency  and  university
economists  will  be  to  recommend  both
criteria and procedures which  are  consistent
with  the  re-emerging  emphasis  on distribu-
tive  equity  as  a  decision  criterion  in  public
land  use  planning.
Some  observers  might  conclude  that  the
apparent  change  in  philosophy  within  the
Bureau of Land Management  is a response te
a  shift  in  national  sentiment.  Others  might
take  a more cynical view toward bureaucratic
adaptation  to  a  new adminstration.  Suppor-
ters of the  "Sagebrush  Rebellion"  well  may
claim that their voices have been heard,  and
their  concerns  heeded.  Any  or  all  of these
views may be valid.  The Bureau  has come to
recognize  that  distributive  equity  issues  do
have a legitimate place in the public land use
decision-making  process.  Time  will  deter-
mine  whether  that  recognition  successfully
averts,  or  has come  too late  to suppress,  the
American  land  reform  movement  of  the
1980s:  The "Sagebrush  Rebellion."
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